An interacting systems model of infant habituation by Sirois, S. & Mareschal, Denis
An Interacting Systems Model of Infant Habituation
Sylvain Sirois1 and Denis Mareschal2
Abstract
& Habituation and related procedures are the primary
behavioral tools used to assess perceptual and cognitive
competence in early infancy. This article introduces a neurally
constrained computational model of infant habituation. The
model combines the two leading process theories of infant
habituation into a single functional system that is grounded in
functional brain circuitry. The HAB model (for Habituation,
Autoassociation, and Brain) proposes that habituation behav-
iors emerge from the opponent, complementary processes of
hippocampal selective inhibition and cortical long-term po-
tentiation. Simulations of a seminal experiment by Fantz
[Visual experience in infants: Decreased attention familiar
patterns relative to novel ones. Science, 146, 668–670, 1964]
are reported. The ability of the model to capture the fine detail
of infant data (especially age-related changes in performance)
underlines the useful contribution of neurocomputational
models to our understanding of behavior in general, and of
early cognition in particular. &
INTRODUCTION
Infancy has long been viewed as a crucial testing ground
for the multiple incarnations of the recurring nature–
nurture debate. In the last 20 years or so, a large number
of infancy studies have explored early infant cognitive
abilities with experiments based on habituation. The
results of these experiments have been presented as
evidence that infants younger than 6 months possess a
conceptual understanding of the world (Spelke, 1998,
1999, 2000; Wynn, 1995; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber,
& Jacobson, 1992; Baillargeon, 1987, 1999). An ongoing
debate ensued when suggestions of complex cognitive
abilities were questioned on the grounds of simpler
perceptual explanations (Sirois, Buckingham, & Shultz,
2000; Haith, 1998), statistical properties of the experi-
ments not related to the concepts under study (Bogartz,
Shinskey, & Speaker, 1997), or methodological issues
(Cohen & Marks, 2002). But this use of habituation
methods to assess infant conceptual development is a
relatively recent turn of events. In fact, habituation
methods continue to play a central role in the investi-
gation of learning, memory, and a range of perceptual
and cognitive phenomena throughout infancy.
Whatever the paradigm or purpose of research, we
believe that a better understanding of what kind of
representations and processes are required to produce
the behaviors observed in young infants can help clarify
habituation findings. In this article, we will argue that
computational modeling of infant habituation with due
consideration to the relevant brain structures that sup-
port habituation can shed some much needed light in
this respect. Indeed, neural computational models that
draw on functional brain systems as sources of con-
straints have provided explanatory frameworks for a
range of infant behaviors (e.g., Westermann & Mares-
chal, 2004; Mareschal & Johnson, 2002; Mareschal, Plun-
kett, & Harris, 1999; Dehaene & Changeux, 1993).
Models are especially useful because they force research-
ers to be explicit about representations and processes.
Moreover, giving the brain due consideration usefully
constrains the range of plausible interpretations. A
model that excels at simulating infant performance but
that contradicts neuroscientific evidence would be, in
our view, of limited interest.
Infant Habituation
Habituation behavior has been observed in a broad range
of species, from simple mollusks to amphibians to mam-
mals, including humans. This has led researchers to dub
such a pervasive process as the ‘‘simplest form of learn-
ing’’ (Thorpe, 1956). However, infancy researchers are
not typically interested in the same processes as ob-
served in mollusks or worms, whereby habituation re-
flects processes local to the sensory receptors (Sirois,
2004). Rather, infant habituation is normally studied
within a framework derived from the pioneering work
of Soviet physiologist Evgeni Sokolov and his colleagues
(Vinogradova, 1975; Sokolov, 1963, 1975).
Within this framework, infants are assumed to build
(through learning) a neural or mental model of stimuli
or stimulus events as these are repeatedly presented.
When a stimulus is presented, it is compared to this
neural model and discrepancies provide the basis for
learning. This is often referred to as the comparator
theory (Gilmore & Thomas, 2002). As learning pro-
gresses, discrepancies between the model and external1University of Manchester, 2Birkbeck University of London
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events decrease, which result in a decrease of attention
(i.e., there is a progressively lesser need to process the
information as the internal model approximates such
information). Crucially, it is assumed that stimuli that
deviate from this internal model would elicit a relative
increase in responding (a behavior referred to as dis-
habituation, release from habituation, or renewed re-
sponding). Indeed, a stimulus perceived as novel would
require more processing than one perceived as familiar.
Early work by Frances Graham and her colleagues
provides a thorough introduction to comparator theory,
and how physiological measures such as heart rate
decelerations provided crucial refinements to the model
(see also Graham, 1992; Graham et al., 1970; Clifton,
Graham, & Hatton, 1968; Graham, Clifton, & Hatton,
1968; Graham & Clifton, 1966).
Renewed responding thus provides researchers with
a unique opportunity to investigate internal representa-
tions in preverbal infants. What infants perceive as novel
(inferred from renewed responding) given a set of
habitual stimuli or events allows for inferences as to
how they represent information. By carefully designing
stimuli sets, researchers can systematically examine in
which ways stimuli may be represented as distinct.1
Another influential account of habituation is proposed
by Groves and Thompson (1970). Dual-process theory
suggests that habituation and sensitization (i.e., in-
creased responding to repeated stimulation) represent
two distinct outcomes of the combination of inde-
pendent excitatory and inhibitory processes. Sensitiza-
tion is viewed as brief and not stimulus specific (i.e., it is a
state arousal phenomenon), and thus should be re-
flected most in early trials, whereas habituation is stim-
ulus specific and involves learning. Both processes
combine to produce overt behavior, whereby the relative
contribution of each is affected by stimulus complexity
and arousal state. For instance, more complex stimuli can
elicit more arousal and also be harder to learn, resulting
in increased responding, relative to simpler stimuli.
Moreover, increased arousal (e.g., using loud background
noise) can augment sensitization relative to habituation.
Although dual-process and comparator theories pertain
to explain habituation, there have been few attempts to
integrate them in a coherent whole (e.g., Graham, 1992).
We believe that computational modeling aimed at
capturing behavioral features of habituation while being
consistent with the neuroscience of habituation would
provide solid basis on which to discuss infant behavior. A
successful neurocomputational model of habituation
would provide a causal framework for understanding
how infants behave, and in particular, whether both
leading theoretical accounts can be integrated. To this
end, we have identified seven behavioral and neural
markers of infant habituation that proper models of
habituation need to accommodate (Sirois & Mareschal,
2002c). Although we certainly do not believe that these
models need to be models of neural circuits per se, we
do believe that they should be consistent with known
functional properties of neural circuits involved in ha-
bituation. Moreover, we are also aware that these neural
and behavioral markers are but a subset of a larger list of
habituation features (e.g., Thompson & Spencer, 1966).
Nevertheless, these seven markers were chosen because
they are directly relevant for current discussions about
infant habituation, and thus as those by which to
evaluate the value of models that attempt to explain
infant habituation. Of the seven markers we identify, the
first five are behavioral, and the last two are derived
from a need for consistency with neural systems.
First, habituation responses generally show an expo-
nential decrease over trials (Thompson & Spencer,
1966). Whether one measures looking times or heart
rate changes, larger values will be recorded on the first
few trials and these will drop rapidly to a low asymptote.2
Secondly, responses have a temporal dimension. Al-
though this may seem obvious, as we are discussing ‘‘du-
rations of looks’’ or ‘‘heart rate changes,’’ the temporal
aspect of responses poses problems for several models of
habituation (Sirois & Mareschal, 2002c). Third, there is a
shift from a familiarity preference to a novelty preference
over the course of habituation (Roder, Bushnell, &
Sasseville, 2000; Hunter, Ames, & Koopman, 1983; Rose,
Gottfried, Melloy-Carminar, & Bridger, 1982; Fantz,
1964). All other things being equal, infants will initially
look longer at familiar items, and it is only later, when
habituation is established, that they look longer at novel
items ( Jankowski, Rose, & Feldman, 2001; see also
Jankowski & Rose, 1997; Rose & Feldman, 1987). Fourth,
novelty responses disappear over repeated testing
(Thompson & Spencer, 1966). In other words, infants
habituate to test stimuli. Finally, infants do not represent
habituated items indiscriminately (Quinn, 1987). Al-
though they may show reduced interest to a class of
stimuli at the end of habituation training, this appears to
be the outcome of a learning process that spares (at least
in part) the identity of individual items.
We also identify two specific neural functions involved
in habituation that models should accommodate. Thus,
the sixth point is that habituation involves a process of
selective inhibition in the hippocampus (Nelson, 2002).
The hippocampus has been identified as the locus of
habituation in a variety of comparative studies (Wang,
1995; Vinogradova, 1975). Hippocampal neurons, over
the course of habituation, show decreased responding
to specific perceptual features or to combinations of
such features (Vinogradova, 1975). The specificity of
decreased responding explains dishabituation, whereby
new stimulus features or combinations of features would
not have been inhibited. The process is fast and mo-
mentary, and is likely sustained by the g-aminobutyric
acid (GABA) neurotransmitter (Disney & Calford, 2001).
Importantly, the hippocampus is largely mature and
functional from birth (Seress, 2001), which explains
neonatal and even in utero habituation.
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The seventh marker is that hippocampal-related cor-
tical areas (especially the entorhinal cortex) are involved
in both habituation and memory formation (Nelson,
2002; Mishkin, Vargha-Khadem, & Gadian, 1998). This
is especially relevant, as the sort of short-term potenti-
ation of the hippocampus cannot account for the well-
documented long-term habituation effects (Zelazo,
Weiss, & Tarquinio, 1991), nor for a potential contribu-
tion of prior experience to habituation performance
(Bachevalier, 2001). Cortical areas allow for an interface
between long-term potentiation (LTP) and short-term
potentiation (STP). Indeed, recent imaging work with
adults suggests that item familiarity memory is mediated
by the perirhinal cortex and the dorsomedial thalamus,
and not the hippocampus (Montaldi, Spencer, Alvarez,
Roberts, & Mayes, 2003).
Data from both nonhuman primates and from hu-
mans suggest that novelty preferences observed in visual
comparison tasks (such as those typically used with
infants) are mediated by the hippocampus and sur-
rounding structures (Bachevalier, Brickson, & Hagger,
1993; McKee & Squire, 1993). In addition, electrophys-
iological studies of monkeys engaged in delayed match-
ing to sample tasks, highlight that neurons in TE, and in
the perirhinal and entorhinal cortices exhibit different
types of responses. A large proportion of neurons
exhibit repetition suppression, whereby the neural re-
sponses are suppressed following repeated exposure to
a stimulus (Miller & Desimone, 1994); this has also been
observed in humans with fMRI (Jiang, Haxby, Martin,
Ungerleider, & Parasuraman, 2000). However, several
neurons in the entorhinal, perirhinal, and prefrontal
cortices show enhanced responses to test stimuli that
match the sample, a so-called response (or match)
enhancement (Suzuki, Miller, & Desimone, 1997; Miller
& Desimone, 1994). Finally, Miller and Desimone (1994)
have shown that responses in the perirhinal cortex are
enhanced with repetition of the sample stimulus; there
appears to be no such enhancement when repeating
nonmatching stimuli. Of course, these findings come
from adult and comparative studies, and must therefore
be interpreted with caution when considering their
implications for infant processing.
To our knowledge, no existing model successfully
captures all seven of the markers above. We therefore
developed the model discussed in the next section.
The HAB Model of Habituation
The HAB model (for Habituation, Autoassociation, and
Brain) maps autoassociator neural networks to a func-
tional, updated version of Sokolov’s (1963) Comparator
framework. Autoassociation is known to exist both in the
neocortex and the hippocampus (Rolls & Treves, 1998).
The model’s functional circuits are depicted schemati-
cally in Figure 1. External input relayed through the
thalamus is forwarded to both the hippocampus and
cortical areas. While the hippocampus learns to selec-
tively inhibit the input, the cortical area learns to repro-
duce its input. These two functional areas have reciprocal
connections, such that the hippocampus dampens pre-
viously processed input to the cortex, and the cortex
amplifies known input to the hippocampus. This oppo-
nent process is related to Groves and Thompson’s (1970)
dual-process theory. Finally, both hippocampal and cor-
tical areas modulate the response systems. Thus, the
HAB model provides a synthesis of the dual-process
(Groves & Thompson, 1970) and the comparator (Soko-
lov, 1963) theories of habituation that is grounded in the
interactions of functional neural systems.
Figure 2 shows a full connectivity diagram for a small
(i.e., three inputs) HAB model. An external input is
processed by both hippocampal and cortical networks.
The output of each network serves to dynamically
modulate the input of the other network, as well as
provide to the overall response of the system on a bank
of output units. Further details, including equations and
parameters, are provided in the Methods section.
We compared the model’s performance against Robert
Fantz’s (1964) seminal experiment on human infant
habituation. In his experiment, Fantz showed infants
aged between 1 and 6 months 10 pairs of various pictures
clipped from magazines. For each child, one picture was
common to all pairs (the constant pattern), and it was
paired with 10 different pictures (the variable pattern).
Looking times to each picture when a pair was shown
Figure 1. Functional organi-
zation of the HAB model. Dark
arrows represent excitatory
pathways, and the light arrow
represents an inhibitory path-
way [adapted from Sirois,
2004].
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were recorded. The performance of the infants (divided
into three age groups3) is shown in Figure 3. For the
younger infants, there was no reliable preference for
either constant or variable patterns. For older infants,
however, there was an increasing preference for the
variable pattern over trials. This preference increased
with age. It is worth noting that Fantz’s paradigm has
been used recently for replication (Roder et al., 2000) and
clinical (Rose, Feldman, & Jankowski, 2002) purposes.
Fantz (1964) identified age-related changes in habitu-
ation patterns that the model can explain through
systematic changes in the functional neural circuits
underpinning habituation. This idea builds in the evi-
dence marshaled in support of a shift from subcortical-
to-cortical control of visual attention (Nelson, 2002;
Johnson, 1990, 1997; Atkinson, 1984; Bronson, 1974).
In this view, early behaviors are largely under the control
of subcortical processes. Cortical control progressively
takes over as development unfolds. With respect to
structures involved in habituation, the hippocampus
and the entorhinal cortex appear relatively mature early
in postnatal life (Seress, 2001; Nelson, 1995). However,
the volume of the limbic cortex reaches adult-like levels
only in the second half of the first year (Nelson, 2002), if
not later (Utsunomiya, Takano, Okazaki, & Mitsudome,
1999). The period between 3 and 12 months of age is
characterized by excessive synaptogenesis (Seress,
2001). In addition, metabolic activity in the temporal
lobe increases during the first 3 months of life, and there
appears to be a growth difference between the hippo-
campus and other structures in the temporal lobe
(Utsunomiya et al., 1999). Moreover, the connections
from the entorhinal cortex to the hippocampus follow at
least two developmentally distinct paths (van Groen,
Miettinen, & Kadish, 2003). Thus, the cortical contribu-
tions to habituation change in many different ways over
time, with adult-like function not fully emerging before
the fifth year postpartum (Seress, 2001). Indeed, Gra-
ham et al. (1968) have also proposed that a possible
subcortical–cortical shift in the first year postpartum
might explain age-related changes in heart rate deceler-
ation during habituation.
In the current model, we simplify this process by
proposing that the strength of the cortical input to both
hippocampal and output systems (weights WOC and
WHC) increases over the first year of life. This has the
effect of increasing the impact on habituation of cortical
computations. We predict that increased cortical contri-
bution to habituation will reproduce age-related effects
observed by Fantz (1964). In reporting the results, we
begin by describing the performance of the model with
default connectivity parameters leading to a perform-
ance level comparable to that of 2- to 4-month-olds. We
then describe how relative decreases and increases of
connectivity between subsystems, mapping maturational
changes, lead to performance levels of 1- and 6-month-
olds, respectively.
RESULTS
The performance of the HAB model with default param-
eters captures the typical behavioral profile of habitua-
tion training, as depicted in Figure 4. Average output
Figure 3. Percentage of time spent looking at constant stimulus in
three different age groups (after Fantz, 1964).
Figure 2. Connectivity diagram of a simple HAB model. External
input would be applied to a bank of input units (I). This external
input propagates to both hippocampal units (H) and cortical units
(C). In the model, selective inhibition in the hippocampus is
implemented by a novelty filter network (Kohonen, 1988), highlighted
in the lower part of the figure. Local processing and learning takes
place in WHH connections. Also highlighted is the cortical system,
whose LTP function is implemented by a standard autoassociator
network. Learning and local processing involves connections in WCC.
Hippocampal units gate input to the cortex through connections WCH,
and cortical units amplify hippocampal input through connections
WHC. The contribution of each system to the output of the model (O)
is weighed by connections WOC and WOH. (Adapted from Sirois &
Mareschal, 2002b.)
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activations4 over processing cycles for 20 networks ex-
hibit exponential decrease over trials. In Figure 5, we
average output across the networks and separate out
activations to constant and variable portions of stimuli.
Although activations are initially larger for the constant
pattern, there is a shift midway through training when
activations become larger for the variable pattern (thus
showing a familiar-to-novel shift). In Figure 6, we plot
average activation to the constant pattern relative to
average overall activation, as Fantz (1964) did (see
Figure 3). The average output to constant stimulus is
divided by overall average output, thereby providing a
relative or proportional activation score for the constant
stimulus with respect to the total activation elicited
by both stimuli. The figure highlights the familiarity–
novelty shift typical of such habituation experiments
with infants (Roder et al., 2000).
It is also interesting to examine the behavior of the
model as it unfolds within a single trial, as shown in
Figure 7. Even by the end of training, when the model
exhibits a stronger response to the variable stimulus on
average, the initial response of a HAB model on the first
cycle of a trial is always stronger for the constant or
familiar stimulus. As training progresses, this initial
familiarity response on a given trial produces stronger
inhibition in the hippocampal system, which results in
progressively more novelty preference.
What of the age-related changes in habituation profiles
observed by Fantz (1964)? Figure 8 shows relative acti-
vation to the constant pattern for immature, default, and
mature versions of the HAB model. The immature model
shows an initial preference for the constant stimulus that
progressively disappears but does not turn into a pref-
erence for the variable pattern. The default model,
discussed above, exhibits a smooth familiarity-to-novelty
shift. Finally, the mature model never quite reaches an
initial familiarity preference despite increased activations
to the constant pattern over the first three epochs. After
the third epoch, the mature model exhibits a progres-
sively more pronounced novelty preference than the
default model. Plotting the data over processing cycles,
as in Figure 9, shows how for each version of the model
the initial response on a trial is always larger for the
constant or familiar pattern. The inhibitory effect of this
Figure 5. Average output activations by epoch for constant and
variable stimuli.
Figure 6. Fantz-type plot of the data from Figure 4. The proportion of
activation values for the constant stimulus over the variable stimuli is
plotted by epoch. Values above 0.5 reflect orienting to the constant
stimulus, whereas values below 0.5 reflect orienting response to the
variable stimulus.
Figure 4. Average unit
activations over all patterns for
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initial activity for the constant stimulus, discussed for the
default version previously, is slight for the immature
model but pronounced in the mature version.
Conclusion
The HAB model is, by design, consistent with the
relevant functional neuroscience of habituation. This,
and the natural emergence of the key behavioral
markers of habituation in human infants, sets it apart
from prior models of habituation (Sirois & Mareschal,
2002c). Indeed, in light of the HAB model’s perform-
ance, the contribution of interacting, opponent pro-
cesses appear as necessary conditions to an account of
infant habituation.
The default parameters of the HAB model produce a
behavioral profile consistent with both the coarse and
fine detail of the 2- to 4-month-olds in Fantz’s (1964)
study. In addition, by varying the effective strength of
the connections from the cortical system, the model
captures the behavioral profiles of infants from 1 to 6
months. In effect, further consideration of the neural
basis of habituation leads to a deeper understanding of
habituation as it unfolds within a trial, as well as it
unfolds across development.
The HAB model, overall, is a promising framework to
study how infants process information during habitua-
tion given its unique ability to explain behavior while
being consistent with the underlying neuroscience. The
model does not implement abstract, conceptual knowl-
edge and as such would be a parsimonious, low-level
account of infant performance. Infant habituation is
viewed as the functional combination of short-term
inhibition and long-term potentiation, whereby the re-
ciprocal connections between these opponent functions
mature in the first year of life. Because it is implemented
as an artificial neural network, the model can easily
generate novel, testable predictions.
As Figures 7 and 9 have shown, the model’s initial
familiarity response at the onset of any trial produces
stronger inhibition in the hippocampal system, resulting
in progressively more novelty preference over process-
ing cycles (increasingly so with maturity). In some ways,
this feature of the model is analogous to the inhibition
of return effect observed in visual attention experiments
(albeit involving different neural structures; see Klein,
Figure 8. Fantz-type plot of data from mature (6-month-old), default
(2- to 4-month-old), and immature (1-month-old) networks. Relative
activations for constant and variable stimuli by epoch are shown for
each type of network.
Figure 7. Plot of data from Figure 5, broken down by processing
cycle. The initial response of the model is always largest for the familiar
or constant stimulus even when the average response (within a trial)
indicates orienting to the novel or variable stimulus.
Figure 9. As shown in Figure 7, but broken down by processing cycle.
Relative activations for constant and variable stimuli by epoch and by
cycle are shown for each type of network. For all networks, the initial
response at the onset of a trial is largest for the constant stimulus,
throughout the simulation.
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2000). The model predicts that in pairwise habituation
experiments, looking times to novel stimuli should be
relatively longer when infants first look at a familiar
stimulus. In other words, the relative novelty of a
stimulus is directly enhanced through inhibition of
familiar information.
An obvious next research step would be to ‘‘situate’’
the model within an environment in which the model’s
current output affects subsequent input. As a prelimi-
nary step, we could use the output to directly modulate
the input through corresponding connections. A more
satisfying solution may eventually involve output control
of a ‘‘foveal’’ area that constrains input.
Two other models of habituation have recently been
proposed. Gilmore and Thomas (2002) describe a
statistical tool to fit habituation curves to individual
infants’ behavior. This tool is an important methodo-
logical advance because it can be used online to assess
when infants reach habituation criterion, taking into
account the effects of noise. However, it is not a
process model of habituation (nor does it claim to
be) and as such serves a different purpose than a model
such as HAB.
Schoener and Thelen (in press), however, have pro-
posed a dynamic field model of habituation which has
many similarities, in spirit, to HAB. In their model, two
coupled and interacting fields produce looking: one
field that drives looking and one that drives looking
away. Like HAB, their model is consistent with the dual-
process theory. However, although this model does a
good job of explaining how an individual habituation
trial unfolds through time, it is unclear where LTP (long-
term learning) takes place in the model. Nor is it clear by
what mechanisms the dynamics of the system are affect-
ed by prior knowledge. Although the temporal dynamics
of the HAB model may be similar to those of the
Schoener and Thelen model, the close mapping be-
tween the HAB model and a functional neural substrate
allows us to make explicit statements about how LTP in
either the cortical or the hippocampal sheets affects the
current habituation behaviors.
By providing a domain general account of habitua-
tion, the HAB model opens many doors for future
research. Just as habituation (as a method) is ubiqui-
tous in infancy research, so too could this model (or
one based on the same processing principles) be used
to model a very broad range of behaviors across a
number of domains. For example, there are two impor-
tant areas to which the HAB model could be applied.
First, the issue of individual differences in habituation,
which has received substantial attention ( Jankowski
et al., 2001; Jankowski & Rose, 1997; Bronson, 1991;
Mayes & Kessen, 1989; Colombo, Mitchell, Obrien, &
Horowitz, 1987a, 1987b; Bornstein & Benasich, 1986;
Ritz, Rose & Feldman, 1984; Woodruff, & Fagen, 1984;
Rose et al., 1982, 2002; McCall, 1979). Gilmore and
Thomas (2002) view habituation data as noise around a
monotonic decreasing exponential function. The crucial
question is to what extent the noise is generated by the
process of habituation (variability of endogenous ori-
gin), as opposed to external sources (variability of
exogenous origin). There are many candidate causes
of endogenous variability in neural networks (see
Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2003, for a full discussion
of potential factors giving rise to individual differences
in connectionist network models). These include noisy
connection weights, restricted connectivity, prior expe-
rience stored in the cortical network, and learning rates
that vary between networks. Exogenous sources of
variability, including differences in arousal, attentional
biases, task demands, and distractions would merely
result in noisy input to the model. However, whether a
definitive answer is even possible remains an open
question. Because many combinations of different pa-
rameter or state changes could lead to the same
observable behavioral variation, it may be almost im-
possible to isolate single causes of individual variation.
However, computer simulations can play an important
role in this debate by mapping out the relation between
parameter states and observed behaviors. By referring
back to this ‘‘map,’’ one can then work back probabi-
listically (e.g., via maximum likelihood estimates) from
individual infant behaviors to likely causes of the indi-
vidual variability in that infant.
A second domain that we have already begun to
investigate is that of perceptual categorization in young
infants because it involves the interaction between
habituating to the immediate stimulus and some repre-
sentation of previously encountered stimuli retrieved
from memory (Mareschal & Quinn, 2001). During the
development of the HAB model, we derived default
parameter values using a generic habituation experi-
ment. We have used these parameters in pilot simula-
tions that successfully capture Quinn’s (1987) habituation
data in a shape categorization tasks with 3- to 4-month-
olds (Sirois & Mareschal, 2002a). Further work along
these lines is currently ongoing.
Combined with the ability of the HAB model to
capture Fantz’s (1964) data as well, and especially the
age-related changes, this breadth of coverage highlights
the utility of neurocomputational models in bridging the
brain–behavior gap.
In summary, the HAB model illustrates how compu-
tational models in developmental cognitive neurosci-
ence can contribute to our understanding of behavior.
With habituation, we show how opponent, complemen-
tary brain functions give rise to the crucial behavioral
markers of interest, and how consideration about the
maturation of the contribution of one of these functions
allows for additional data coverage. The model, being
explicit about representations and processes, allows for
a detailed examination of how information is processed.
This, in turns, leads to testable predictions that push the
research agenda forward.
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METHODS
Stimuli
Whereas Fantz (1964) showed infants a series of photo-
graphs collected from magazines, we presented the
networks with small black and white bitmap images to
represent 10 pairs of stimuli, where one stimulus is
constant between pairs. Counterbalancing for position,
this required 20 images, shown in Figure 10. The
constant stimulus was represented by a cross, and the
10 variable stimuli were represented by bands.5 Each
pixel in an image served as input to the model, thus
requiring 5  10 = 50 input units. To avoid the issue of
how complex visual images are preprocessed and be-
cause Fantz’s results should generalize beyond the
specific set of stimuli that he used (and they have, see
Roder et al., 2000), we have used simple stimuli that
allow us to replicate the experiment and implement
salience controls. Stimuli had equal salience, as every
stimulus was a unique combination of five ‘‘live’’ bits or
features. Moreover, the constant stimulus had varying
levels of perceptual overlap or similarity with the vari-
able stimuli: no shared feature with four stimuli, one
shared feature with four stimuli, and three shared
features with two stimuli. Each of the variable stimuli
shared features with five other variable stimuli.6
Simulation Details
An external stimulus is presented to a bank of thalamic
input units (see Figure 2). Their activations are for-
warded to corresponding units in both the hippocampal
and the cortical networks. These are autoassociator
neural networks, which circulate activations internally
such that a unit stimulates or inhibits every other unit in
the local network. For a given input pattern, the hippo-
campal network learns to inhibit active units (leading to
selective inhibition), whereas the cortical network learns
to activate active units (leading to response enhance-
ment). Reciprocal connections between both networks
allow hippocampal units to modulate the activity of
corresponding units in the cortical network, and vice-
versa. Both networks contribute to the response of the
model to an external input. Activity on the output units
is expected to direct the attention of the organism to
specific aspects of the environment (see Sokolov, 1963).
That is, the more active the response to a feature, the
more processing is requested. Activity of output units
serves as our measure of interest, which in a more
complete system would drive what Sokolov called the
orienting reflex.
When a pattern is initially presented to the model
(i.e., the input units take the value of the corresponding
features of the image, zero or one, as their activation
value), the net input to both the hippocampal and
cortical systems is equal to the input times an input
scalar a, which determines the contribution of the
external input relative to internal activity. Units in both
systems compute their resulting activations as
ai ¼ 1
1þ expðnetiÞ ð1Þ
where ai is the activation of unit i, and neti is the net
input reaching unit i. Equation 1 is a logistic function,
which produces an s-shaped output (i.e., a smooth,
threshold-like function with range [0, 1]).
Activations are then circulated within and between
systems over a number of processing cycles. At any time
t + 1, where t is the preceding processing step, the net
input to the hippocampal system can be computed by
netiðtþ 1Þ ¼ Ii WHCi  CiðtÞ þ
X
n
WHHin  HnðtÞ ð2Þ
where neti(t + 1) is the net input to unit i in the
hippocampus at time t + 1, a is the input scalar, Ii is the
activation of input unit i, WHCi is the cortex to
hippocampus weight for corresponding unit i, Ci(t) is
the activation of cortical unit i at time t, n is the number
of inputs, WHHin are the internal weights between
hippocampal units i and n, and Hn is the activation of
hippocampal unit n. Updated activations are obtained
by using the results of Equation 2 with Equation 1.
Similarly, for cortical units, net input at time t + 1 is
computed by
netiðtþ 1Þ ¼ Ii WCHi  HiðtÞ þ
X
n
WCCin  CnðtÞ ð3Þ
where neti(t + 1) is the net input to unit i in the cortex
at time t + 1, a is the input scalar, Ii is the activation of
input unit i, WCHi is the hippocampus to cortex weight
for feature i, Hi(t) is the activation of hippocampal unit i
at time t, n is the number of inputs, WCCin are the
internal weights between cortical units i and n, and Cn is
the activation of cortical unit n. Again, updated acti-Figure 10. Stimuli used to simulate Fantz’s (1964) experiment.
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vations are obtained by using the results of Equation 3
with Equation 1.
Finally, net input to output units at any time t is
computed with
netiðtÞ ¼ WOHi  HiðtÞ þWOCi  CiðtÞ ð4Þ
where neti(t) is the net input to output unit i at time t,
WOHi is the hippocampus to output weight for feature
i, Hi(t) is the activation of hippocampal unit i at time t,
WOCi are the cortex to output weights for feature i, and
Ci is the activation of cortical unit i. The updated activity
of output units is obtained by using the results of
Equation 4 in Equation 1.
The only modifiable weights in the model are the
internal weights in both the hippocampal and cortical
systems. These were modified on every processing cycle.
For the hippocampal system, the learning rule was
wij ¼ lðfloor aiÞaj ð5Þ
where wij is the amount by which to change the
connection weight between receiving unit i and sending
unit j, l is the learning rate, floor is the minimum value of
the activation function (with Equation 1, it is 0), ai is the
activation of receiving unit i, and aj is the activation of
sending unit j. With such a rule, proposed by Kohonen
(1988), the activity of a unit i becomes inhibited by any
unit j when they share correlated activity.
For cortical connections, weights are changed using
the delta rule, or Widrow–Hoff rule, expressed as
wij ¼ lðii  aiÞaj ð6Þ
where wij is the amount by which to change the
weight between receiving unit i and sending unit j, l is
the learning rate, ii the input value for feature i, ai the
activation of receiving unit i, and aj the activation of
sending unit j. With this rule, weight changes are prog-
ressively smaller as activations approach target values
(i.e., the input).
The number of processing cycles on a given trial was
set to 5. Networks were trained for 10 blocks of trials,
where each block (called an epoch) consisted of a pre-
sentation of each of the input patterns in random order.
An input scalar (a) of 1.5 was used for both cortical and
hippocampal subsystems. The learning rates (l) for the
hippocampus and the cortex were 0.001 and 0.1, respec-
tively. Reciprocal weights from hippocampus to cortex
(WCH) and cortex to hippocampus (WHC) were set to 1.
Output weights from the hippocampus (WOH) were set
to 1, and output weights from the cortex (WOC) were set
to 4. For the mature model (6-month-olds), WHC and
WOC were set to 2 and 8, respectively. For the immature
model (1-month-olds), these same parameters were set
to 0.5 and 2.
These parameters were originally derived during
pilot work (Sirois & Mareschal, 2002b). Learning rates
were adapted to the specific size of input used in the
current simulations. Maturational parameters were de-
rived from a pilot simulation of this task, using orthog-
onal (as opposed to overlapping) stimuli (Sirois &
Mareschal, 2003).
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Notes
1. If researchers designed stimuli or events that differed
solely on a conceptual basis (and, importantly, not at the
perceptual level), then renewed responding to conceptually
novel items would certainly support the suggestion that infants
exhibit the underlying conceptual ability to distinguish such
conceptually distinct events. Whether this is actually possible
remains an open question (Sirois & Mareschal, 2002c).
2. We recognize that the actual shape of responses may vary
from stimulus to stimulus, and between individuals. Thus, this
point may refer only to the overall trend. McCall (1979) had
raised the issue of whether monotonic, exponential decrease
was a feature of responses for only a subset of infants. Recent
work by Gilmore and Thomas (2002), using advanced
mathematical models, has shown that McCall’s results were
statistical artifacts, and that infants who habituate have
behavior that is best explained by a monotonic decreasing
exponential function when noise is filtered out.
3. For clarity, we have combined the similar curves of 2–3 and
3–4 months in Fantz’ report, weighing the original data points
for unequal group size.
4. This is the average activation value of the 50 output units.
5. For our purposes, the different shapes are essentially
illustrative. At this stage there is no boundary or shape
detection built into the model. Each stimulus is merely a
specific set of 5 ‘‘on’’ bits in a 5  10 field.
6. We have also replicated Fantz’s findings using less realistic,
orthogonal stimuli.
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